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Three Cheers for Three Tiers:  Why the Three-Tier System
Maintains Its Legal Validity and Social Benefits
After Granholm
Roni A. Elias*
INTRODUCTION
Alcohol consumption has the potential to be either a great benefit
or a great detriment to the United States economy.  The direct retail
sales of beer, wine and spirits at licensed establishments creates over
1.7 million jobs throughout the United States; and these direct retail
sales create an more than 750,000 additional jobs in ancillary enter-
prises, such as suppliers.1  In 2014, all of these enterprises together
were responsible for as much as $245 billion in total economic activity
throughout the nation.2  The business entities involved in the sale of
alcohol, along with their employees, pay over $19.3 billion in federal
taxes, and $16.9 billion in state and local taxes.3
At the same time, the excessive consumption of alcohol is both a
public health problem and a source of grave economic loss.  Alcohol
abuse can lead to declining productivity in the workplace, increased
illness and associated health care expenses, criminal justice expenses,
and property damages, especially damages to motor vehicles involved
in alcohol related accidents.4  The Center for Disease Control and
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appreciate the love of my life, M.G.S, for her love and making me smile every minute of every
day.  To Dr.’s Aida & Adil Elias, my first great teachers in life, I thank you and appreciate more
than words can ever say. I am truly grateful to the best brother anyone could be blessed to have,
my brother, Pierre A. Elias. To the DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal, for their non-
stop attention to detail I appreciate and thank.
1. ABL Releases New Economic Impact Study; Reflects Positive Impact of Beverage Licensees,
AMERICAN BEVERAGE LICENSEES, (November 14, 2014), http://ablusa.org/2014/11/abl-releases-
new-economic-impact-study-reflects-positive-impact-of-beverage-licensees/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Prevention, Excessive Drinking Costs U.S. $223.5 Billion, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/alcoholconsumption/ (last updated Apr. 17,
2014).
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Prevention estimates that, in 2010, such problems caused economic
losses totaling $249 billion across the entire U.S. economy.5
Since the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933,
which ended Prohibition, the United States has employed a system for
the distribution and retail sale of alcohol that has helped maximize the
social benefits of alcohol use and minimize its dangers social costs.  In
this “three-tier” system, the producers of alcoholic beverages sell their
products only to state-licensed distributors, who are the exclusive
source for state-licensed retail outlets, including both liquor stores and
bars and restaurants.6  State-laws generally prohibit or greatly restrict
the direct sale of alcohol from producers to consumers.7
The three-tier system promotes the effective regulation of consump-
tion because the regulations are made at the state level and therefore
can be responsive to local concerns and unique local circumstances.8
The system also promotes economic efficiency by helping producers
receive accurate information about consumer demand.  Given their
unique – and exclusive – position between consumers and producers,
distributors have the informational and economic ability to make sure
that products are directed to retail outlets with the greatest demand at
a low cost.9
Since its inception in the wake of Prohibition, the three-tier system,
including its ban on direct sales to consumers, was understood to be
an exercise of state power conferred by the Twenty-First Amend-
ment.10  In 2005, in Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme
Court invoked the dormant Commerce Clause to rule that states
could not use the ban on direct sales to consumers as an instrument
for discriminating against products from other states.11  Thus, the
Court imposed a limitation on states’ ability to use the structure of the
three-tier system to regulate sales; but Granholm also re-affirmed the
general validity of the three-tier system,12 and left some uncertainty
5. Fact Sheets - Alcohol Use & Your Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION, http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/alcohol-use.htm (last updated Feb. 4, 2016).
6. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (discussing the “three-tier” system of
regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages at the state level).
7. See generally, Kevin C. Quigley, Uncorking Granholm: Extending the Nondiscrimination
Principle to All Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871, 1877-78 (2011) (discussing
the current limits on the direct shipment of wine from producers to consumers).
8. See infra § II.A.
9. See infra § II.B.
10. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market, Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936) (dis-
cussing the scope of state power to regulate alcohol sales under the Twenty-First Amendment).
11. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473.
12. Id. at 489.
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about when and how states could continue to use a ban on direct sales
as an element of that system.
Since Granholm, federal courts have upheld state-law restrictions
on direct shipment, and the three-tier system has survived and even
thrived.  Its ability to promote economic efficiency and to serve as a
framework for effective regulation has benefitted consumers, produc-
ers and society as a whole.  While the Court’s ruling in Granholm pro-
hibited the use of regulations under the three-tier system as a means
of discrimination against producers or products based on their loca-
tion, that ruling and numerous judicial opinions following it have af-
firmed that the three-tier system is a legitimate instrument by which
state governments may regulate alcohol sales.13
This paper argues that the three-tier system is not only a legitimate
means of regulating alcohol sales but also a beneficial one that should
be maintained.  It begins this argument in Part I by describing the
basic characteristics of the three-tier system.  In Part II, it reviews how
the three-tier system was developed after over a century of largely
failed attempts to effectively regulate alcohol sales, and it explains
how that system provides significant regulatory and economic advan-
tages.  Part III discusses how the expansion of direct shipment from
suppliers to consumers and retailers threatens many of the benefits
conferred by the three-tier system.  Finally, Part IV reviews the
Granholm decision and subsequent judicial rulings to see whether and
to what extent the three-tier system can be maintained in a manner
consistent with constitutional law.
I. THE NATURE OF THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM
Many industries are built around a three-part structure that includes
producers, wholesalers, and retailers.  The business of selling alcoholic
beverages is no exception.  The wine and spirits industry has three
main elements: (1) product manufacturers, (2) wholesale-distributors
and (3) product retailers.14 In most parts of the U.S., wine and spirits
are distributed through these three segments, and this method of dis-
tribution is collectively referred to as the three-tier system.15
One of the chief objectives of the system is to rationalize and
streamline the distribution of the incredibly wide variety of products
available to consumers.  In the first tier of the system, the producers of
13. Id. at 493.
14. Davis S. Sibley & Padmanabhan Srinagesh, Dispelling the Myths of the Three-Tier Distri-
bution System WINE AND SPIRIT WHOLESALERS OF AMERICA 6 (2008), http://www.five-star-
wine-and-spirits.com/includes/archivos/about_ five_start/pdf/three_tier_01.pdf.
15. Id.
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alcoholic beverages bottle a wide range of products, many of which
are targeted at narrow market niches.  For example, there are literally
hundreds of thousands of different types of wine available to consum-
ers; Wine Spectator magazine offers reviews of 332,000 different
wines.16  Similarly, one website that lists popular brands of tequila
identifies 89 different tequila products, ranging in price from under
$20 to over $90.17  In fact, the number of distilleries that produce all
kinds of spirits are increasing dramatically.  According to the Ameri-
can Craft Spirits Association, the number of local, craft distilleries in
the United States increased from about 50 in 2005 to 769 in 2015.18
And, of course, the recent growth of craft breweries is well-known;
the volume of production from craft breweries, many of which serve
only local or regional markets, almost doubled between 2006 and
2012.19
Producers sell this plethora of brands and products to wine and spir-
its wholesale distributors, who, in turn, resell those products retail-
ers.20  Wholesalers are not merely brokers or agents who work on a
commission basis.  Rather, wine and spirits wholesalers are merchant
wholesalers who purchase goods on their own account for resale.
Merchant wholesalers earn profits on commercially successful prod-
ucts and incur losses on failed products.21 Wholesale distributors are
licensed by state governments, and there are distributors of all sizes.
According to one study completed in 2008, there were approximately
16,000 wholesaler licensees in the United States in 2008.22
Because so many of these products have specialized appeal, the
wholesale distributors that make up the middle tier of the system do
much more than serve as a passive conduit for products; they play an
important role in identifying the local retail markets where unique
products will have the most success.  Because wholesalers serve a wide
variety of retailers, they have an unparalleled opportunity to identify
any common trends or differences among the retailers they serve
16. See WINE SPECTATOR, WINE RATINGS, http://www.winespectator.com/wineratings (last
visited November 28, 2015).
17. Colleen Graham, A Guide to Popular Tequila Brands, ABOUT FOOD (updated February
19, 2016), http://cockta ils.about.com/od/spirits/tp/tequila_brands.htm.
18. Chris Morris, Craft Distilleries: The Next Local Liquor Boom? FORTUNE (Aug. 1, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015 /08/01/distilleries-craft-beer-liquor/.
19. 2012 Small & Independent Craft Brewers’ Growth in the Beer Category, BREWERS ASSOCI-
ATION, http://www.c raftbeer.com/wp-content/uploads/BrewStat.png (last visited November 28,
2015) (showing that production at craft breweries increased from 7.1 million barrels in 2006 to
13.2 million in 2012).
20. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 14.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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and?to convey their understanding of the marketplace to the suppliers
they represent.23 Thus, wholesalers collect and distribute important in-
formation that helps both retailers and producers respond more effi-
ciently to changing consumer preferences.24
Consequently, wholesale distributors play an important role in mar-
keting.  With respect to individual liquor products, the producer cre-
ates a consumer image, and the wholesaler communicates that image
to the retailers with whom it contracts; and retailers then communi-
cate that image to consumers.25  Retail establishments form the third
tier of the system.  Such establishments include full service restaurants
(those serving alcohol), bars, and retail stores that sell beer, wine, and
liquor.  According to recent Census data, there are nearly a quarter-
million full service restaurants,26 nearly 50,000 bars,27 and about
33,000 liquor stores28 in the United States.  For many customers, retail
outlets are not just a convenient source for wine and spirits, they are
also a principal source of information about, and a place to sample,
new products.29
The range of selections at retail outlets varies substantially. A typi-
cal bar or full-service restaurant offers consumers a few dozen wines
and spirits.30 Larger traditional retailers such as Knightsbridge Wines
in Illinois and the Wine Club in California stock about 8,000 distinct
items.31 By contrast, a typical Costco Wholesale Corp. outlet sells 120
wine labels and 30 to 35 spirits labels at any one time, and approxi-
mately half of the labels change every year.32
Given the wide range of products in the market and the variation of
products available at different retailers, consumers often rely on retail
stores for product information.  Knowledgeable staff, product demon-
strations, such as tastings, and promotional displays are all available in
the retail store, and they all help consumers decide products suit their
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 ECONOMIC CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES:  AC-
COMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICES: PRELIMINARY SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED
STATES, 2012, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
ECN_2012_US_72I1&prodType=table (last visited March 20, 2016).
27. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 ECONOMIC CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: RE-
TAIL TRADE: PRELIMINARY SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 2012, http://factfind
er.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ECN_2012_US_44I1&prod
Type=table (last visited March 20, 2016).
28. Id.
29. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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tastes.33  Much of this information comes from wholesale distributors
who educate the staff of retail stores, pay for the promotional displays,
and furnish products for tastings.34  The costs to wholesalers for pro-
viding marketing support to retailers are extensive, sometimes run-
ning in excess of $10 million annually for large, regional distributors.35
II. THE ORIGINS AND POLICY REASONS FOR
THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM
A. Origins
In historical terms, the three-tier system is a product of attempts at
reforming the regulation of alcohol sales around the time of the
Twenty-First Amendment, which ended Prohibition.  When it became
apparent that Prohibition was not going to succeed in solving the so-
cial and public health problems associated with abusive alcohol con-
sumption, government officials and policy activists sought another
way, that their efforts resulted in the three-tier system.  Consequently,
the three-tier system is, to a great extent, a response to failed efforts at
alcohol regulation that preceded it, and understanding its effects, par-
ticularly in the regulatory context, requires some understanding of its
background and origins.
From the colonial period through the end of the nineteenth century,
Americans were concerned with controlling excessive and abusive al-
cohol consumption, but the patchwork of conflicting state laws di-
rected towards this end was not especially effective.  States
experimented with various statutes that limited opportunities to
purchase alcohol, and many states entirely prohibited the purchase
and sale (but not necessarily the production) of alcohol.36  Neverthe-
less, the problems associated with alcohol abuse continued to prolifer-
ate into the early twentieth century, as alcohol consumption increased
by as much as 33 percent in the first decade of the twentieth century
and the death rate from cirrhosis of the liver and chronic alcoholism
reached high levels.37
Concern with this worsening problem led to federal legislation.  In
an effort to protect states that had chosen to completely ban alcohol,
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 20.
36. See RUSSELL BLAINE NYE, SOCIETY & CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830-1860 48-50 (1974);
RONALD G. WALTERS, AMERICAN REFORMERS 1815-1860 135-37 (1978).
37. Jack S. Blocker, Jr., Did Prohibition Really Work? Alcohol Prohibition as a Public Health
Innovation, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 233, 236 (2006).
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Congress enacted the Webb–Kenyon Act in 1913.38  It prohibited the
interstate transportation of any form of alcohol into a state where that
form of alcohol was illegal.39  The Supreme Court affirmed the consti-
tutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act in James Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Maryland Railroad Co., reasoning that the only purpose for
the legislation “was to give effect to state prohibition” laws.40  The
Court made it clear that Webb-Kenyon did not give states the power
to authorize the sale of liquor generally and to treat out-of-state liquor
on unequal, discriminatory terms.41  Thus, the Court held that, under
the constitutional framework in place before Prohibition, states could
regulate alcohol any way they chose, but the Commerce Clause pre-
vented states from enacting any regulation that discriminated on the
basis of where alcohol was produced.42
The political momentum that helped to support the Webb-Kenyon
Act soon resulted in the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited
“the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors”
within the United States, and the import or export of intoxicating li-
quors to or from the United States.43  But the total prohibition on all
commerce in alcoholic beverages seemed to generate more problems
than it solved.  Although alcohol consumption declined and absti-
nence increased during Prohibition,44 compliance with the ban on al-
cohol sales was anything but uniform, especially because there were
many Americans who consumed alcohol moderately and responsibly
and thought that a total ban on alcohol sales was an unwarranted
means to curb abusive consumption.  In addition, most Americans
thought that Prohibition helped to increase lawlessness and the
growth of organized crime.45  Consequently, public support for Prohi-
bition waned quickly, and many Americans began to try to formulate
a way to regulate alcohol use that was short of an outright ban but
38. See 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2015).
39. Id.
40. James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., 242 U.S. 311, 337 (1917).
41. Id. at 324.
42. See id.; see also Quigley, supra note 7, at 1877.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.  It is worth noting that the Eighteenth Amendment did
not outlaw the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
44. Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Alcohol Consumption During Prohibition, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 242, 244–247 (1991); Blocker, supra note 37, at 237.
45. Blocker, supra note 37, at 237; see also ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF
EXCESS 211–212, 220–230 (1962).
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that would also be effective in avoiding the problems of abuse that
had helped prompt Prohibition.46
There were varying proposals for reforming the regulation of alco-
hol sales.  Some, led by John D. Rockefeller, called for a government
monopoly on the production and consumption of all alcoholic bever-
ages.47  Although this particular policy prescription was not uniformly
adopted, eighteen states eventually followed a version of it by creating
a government monopoly on distribution and, in some cases, permitting
retail sales of packaged liquor only in government-owned outlets.48
Today, seventeen states employ some variation of this regulatory sys-
tem, although these state retail monopolies tend to focus on liquors
with relatively high alcoholic content.49
The most widely adopted proposal for regulating alcohol sales and
use was what is now known as the three-tier system.  In general, this
system was designed to discourage drinking in bars and saloons and
encourage it in restaurants and above all, at home.50  The right to sell
alcohol was subject to licenses issued by a commission that operated
as an agency of state government.51  Retail sales were permitted only
in restaurants, bars, and stores that were licensed by the state commis-
sion, and there were different categories of licenses for beer and wine,
on the one hand, and distilled spirits, on the other.52 When it came to
issuing licenses authorizing on-premises consumption, state commis-
sions tended to favor establishments where food was served.53  Retail
sales were permitted only in restaurants, bars, and stores that were
licensed by the state commission, and there were different categories
of licenses for beer and wine, on the one hand, and distilled spirits, on
the other.54 When it came to issuing licenses authorizing on-premises
consumption, state commissions tended to favor establishments where
food was served.55  The scheme also limited whom retailers could
purchase from.  In general, direct purchasing from producers was out-
46. HARRY G. LEVINE & CRAIG REINARMAN, ALCOHOL PROHIBITION AND DRUG PROHIBI-
TION:  LESSONS FROM ALCOHOL POLICY FOR DRUG POLICY in DRUGS AND SOCIETY: U.S. PUB-
LIC POLICY 59 (Jefferson M. Fish, ed., 2006).
47. Id. at 59.
48. State Control of Alcohol: Protecting the Public’s Health, ALCOHOL JUSTICE, https://al-
coholjustice.org/images/fa ctsheets/StateControlPublicHealth2014.pdf (last visited Nov. 29,
2015).
49. Id.
50. Blocker, supra note 37, at 239.
51. LEVINE & REINARMAN, supra note 46, at 56-57.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB202.txt unknown Seq: 9 26-MAY-16 14:32
2015] THREE CHEERS FOR THREE TIERS 217
lawed, and retailers could purchase only from wholesalers who were
also licensed by the state commission.56
Once it was possible to imagine an effective regulatory regime, such
as the three-tier system, the repeal of Prohibition seemed more feasi-
ble.  Consequently, on December 5, 1933, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment was ratified.57  Section 1 of the amendment repealed the
Eighteenth Amendment.58  Section 2 provided that “[t]he transporta-
tion or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in vio-
lation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”59  Since its ratifica-
tion, the meaning of Section 2 has been a matter of uncertainty and
conflict within the federal judiciary.60  According to one view, Section
2 created new authority for state governments to regulate alcohol, un-
fettered by the Commerce Clause.61  According to an opposing view,
Section 2 only gave states plenary authority to regulate alcohol within
their borders, and it did not give states any authority to enact laws
that would have a restrictive or discriminatory effect in interstate
commerce.62
This uncertainty about the legal significance of Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment has created questions about the extent to
which states can use the three-tier system to prohibit the direct ship-
ment of alcohol from producers to consumers. This uncertainty in turn
creates a question about the preservation of the entire system because
the system can continue to function only if there are essentially exclu-
sive relationships between producers and wholesale distributors and
between wholesalers and retailers.  And the three-tier system provides
an essential framework for the business of selling alcoholic beverages.
As its history shows, it was created for a purely regulatory purpose,
and, over eighty years of practical experience, it is clear that the sys-
tem serves that purpose well.  In addition, recent economic analyses
56. Id.
57. U.S. CONST., amend. XXI.
58. U.S. CONST., amend. XXI, § 1.
59. U.S. CONST., amend. XXI, § 2.
60. Compare Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (“The Twenty-first Amendment
sanctions the right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without,
unfettered by the Commerce Clause.”) and United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293,
299 (1945) (holding that granting states full authority to regulate alcohol within their borders
does not give them “plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct of persons doing an
interstate liquor business outside their boundaries”).
61. See Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 138; see also State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market, Co., 299
U.S. 59, 64 (1936).
62. See Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. at 299; see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473
(2005).
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have shown that the system provides important economic benefits that
enhance the salutary economic effect of alcoholic beverages.
B. Regulatory Advantages
Given the dangers associated with alcohol abuse, the effective regu-
lation of alcohol sales is of paramount importance.  As one commen-
tator has noted, alcohol is “no ordinary commodity,”63 and, therefore,
extra care must be taken in regulating it.  According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), excessive alcohol use can
lead to a variety of serious, chronic diseases including  high blood
pressure, heart disease, stroke, liver disease, digestive problems, sev-
eral types of cancer, learning and memory problems, mental health
problems (such as depression and anxiety), social problems (such as
lost productivity, family problems, and unemployment), and, of
course, alcohol dependence, or alcoholism.64  These problems are cer-
tainly keenly felt across all segments of American society.  As the
CDC points out:
Excessive alcohol use led to approximately 88,000 deaths and 2.5
million years of potential life lost (YPLL) each year in the United
States from 2006 – 2010, shortening the lives of those who died by
an average of 30 years.  Further, excessive drinking was responsible
for 1 in 10 deaths among working-age adults aged 20-64 years. The
economic costs of excessive alcohol consumption in 2010 were esti-
mated at $249 billion, or $2.05 a drink.65
When the locus of regulation is at the state level, the regulatory
authority can tailor its rules to local conditions.  For example, a state
government could establish a procedure by which local communities
could set their own rules for alcohol sales, even to the point that they
would prohibit alcohol sales altogether within their area.66  As one
Congressman has noted, “an effective tool of local neighborhoods in
Chicago has been the ability to vote, through ballot referendum, an
area ‘dry.’”67  Thus, the three-tier system provides an unmatched abil-
ity to empower local communities.  If the regulatory authority is cen-
tralized at a federal level, or if direct sales via the Internet effectively
deprive state and local authorities of their ability to regulate sales,
these kinds of locally-oriented regulations would disappear.
63. THOMAS BABOR ET AL., ALCOHOL: NO ORDINARY COMMODITY (2003).
64. Alcohol Use & Your Health, supra note 5.
65. Id. (internal citations omitted).
66. Legal Issues Concerning State Alcohol Regulation:  Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Courts and Competition Policy of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 145 (2010) (statement
of Rep. Rush, Member, H. Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy).
67. Id.
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One aspect of the local tailoring of regulations is the capacity to
make a quick response to new developments and problems.  For ex-
ample, in 2011, the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission learned of
“rampant alcohol abuse and bootlegging” in a town of about two
dozen residents on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in a remote
area of the state’s panhandle.68  Commission officials acted to restrict
the hours during which alcohol sales can be made in the town and
surrounding area and to take other remedial measures designed to
specifically respond to unique local conditions.69  Similarly, in Wash-
ington state, the Liquor Control Board has taken information about
alcohol products that are abused in particular local areas, and it has
taken special measures to restrict their availability in those localities.70
Another significant regulatory advantages of the three-tier system is
that it permits effective enforcement.  As noted by Nida Samona, the
Chairperson of the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, the physi-
cal proximity of commission staff and local law enforcement to retail-
ers and wholesalers ensures “that in-state retailers and wholesalers are
physically inspected and checked to verify that [the] regulatory system
is being followed, that only approved alcoholic beverages are being
sold, that alcoholic beverages are not being sold to underage persons,
and that taxes are being paid.”71  This oversight gives states “the abil-
ity and that power to bring [noncompliant] licensees in, to suspend
them for a few days. . . . , to take away the license, to go onsite. . . .,”
either through state officials or local police.72
Ultimately, the decentralized regulatory regime enabled by the
three-tier system makes producers, wholesalers, and retailers alike ac-
countable to local communities.  As a policy expert recently observed,
“[a]s this industry becomes more and more consolidated, more and
more globalized, it is critical to be able to regulate as much as we can
at the local level. And not just retailers, but wholesalers,” are instru-
mental to this project.73  Indeed, private actors at each of the three
68. Grant Schulte, Nebraska Lawmakers Mull Alcohol Problems in Whiteclay, News from In-
dian Country (Oct. 2011), http://www.indiancountrynews.com/index.php/news/9-news-from-
through-out-indian-country/12063-nebraska-lawmakers-mull-alcohol-problems-in-whiteclay (last
visited Nov. 29, 2015).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Legal Issues Concerning State Alcohol Regulation, supra note 64, at 43 (statement of Nida
Samona, Chairperson, Michigan Liquor Control Commission).
72. Id. at 145.
73. Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness (CARE) Act of 2010: Hearing on H.R.
5034 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 159 (2010) (statement of Michele Si-
mon, Research and Policy Director, Marin Institute), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/
pdf/ Simon100929.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
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tiers have significant incentives to assure that their business partners
in the other tiers adhere to regulations.74  For example, a wholesaler
has an interest in encouraging the retailers with whom they do busi-
ness to comply with applicable regulations, and the wholesaler also
has the day-to-day contact with retailers that would enable them to
identify and address any compliance problems.
All of these aspects of the regulatory regime associated with the
three-tier system show that it remains well-suited to addressing the
policy considerations that inspired its adoption in so many states after
the repeal of Prohibition in 1933.  The three-tier system provides a
flexible regulatory structure that can be readily tailored to local condi-
tions, which assures that its rules will be more likely to find public
acceptance as well as to effectively promote the safer consumption
and sale of alcohol.  Moreover, even though these regulatory consid-
erations are of paramount importance, they are not the only reasons
why the three-tier system is an especially effective means of organiz-
ing the sale of alcoholic beverages.
C. Economic Advantages
Although it was originally designed with a purely regulatory pur-
pose, the three-tier system has proven to serve important economic
objectives as well.  Given the enormous – if not overwhelming – vari-
ety of alcoholic beverage products, and given the variation in con-
sumer demand across different geographic areas, the marketing of
those products to consumers is a difficult and complicated process.
For one thing, it is virtually impossible for an individual consumer to
be educated about the thousands of different products that he or she
might purchase.  The three-tier system provides an invaluable instru-
ment for conveying information and reducing transaction costs within
the alcoholic beverage industry.
Until recently, there have been few analyses of the economic impact
of the three-tier system.  But in a 2008 study, David S. Sibley and
Padmanabhan Srinagesh provide a sophisticated analysis of the eco-
nomics of the three-tier system, drawing on economic data from firms
in the system, other econometric data, and interviews with major play-
ers in wholesale distribution and retail sales.75  This study and other
related scholarship and data provide insight into how the three-tier
74. Legal Issues Concerning State Alcohol Regulation supra, note 64, at 45 (statement of Nida
Samona, then-Chairperson, Michigan Liquor Control Commission).
75. Sibley & Srinagesh, note 14.
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system improves the economic efficiency of the alcoholic beverage in-
dustry as a whole.
One of the principal ways that the three-tier system produces eco-
nomic efficiency is to reduce transaction costs across all segments of
the industry.  Given the extraordinary variety of products that suppli-
ers deliver to one end of the market, and given the equally broad vari-
ety of demand across all consumers at the other end of the market, it
is possible, in theory, for significant inefficiencies caused by a large
number of transactions.  For example, consider a consumer who likes
to drink Budweiser beer, a brand of tequila produced by a boutique
distillery, and a few specific varieties of wine.  Such a consumer might
visit his local liquor store on a weekly basis, usually buying beer, and
purchasing his favorite wine products somewhat less frequently, and
his favorite tequila only a few times a year.  If that local liquor store
wants to assure that it is his first choice for all of his purchases, it will
have to keep all of those products in stock, but the cost of maintaining
inventory for this kind of complex purchasing behavior can be very
high, especially when the store has dozens or even hundreds of cus-
tomers who each have their own unique preferences and purchasing
patterns.  Juggling the purchase of so many different products from
many different suppliers in varying amounts can be difficult for any
retailer.
The three-tier system streamlines this process and reduces the trans-
action costs because wholesale distributors can serve a crucial inter-
mediary function. Wholesalers can match the different needs of
suppliers and retailers “by maintaining inventories in their ware-
houses and operating transportation fleets to deliver wine and spirits
to retail outlets in a timely manner.”76  This is so because wholesalers
have the capacity to routinely deliver individual bottles or split cases
(cases customized with various individual bottles) to stores, bars, and
restaurants, usually in a turnaround period of a day or two.77  The
presence of wholesalers as intermediaries means that suppliers can sell
large volumes of products in a relatively small number of transactions
and that retailers can customize their ordering to meet the diverse
demands of their customers without incurring the cost of maintaining
a large inventory.78  The service that wholesalers provide in the busi-
ness of selling alcoholic beverages makes it possible to funnel the wide
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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variety of available products to different market niches with efficiency
that would not be available in a marketplace without wholesalers.79
These efficiencies become more important as computer-based tech-
nology plays an ever-increasing role in inventory management.  Be-
cause the sale of alcoholic beverages is so heavily regulated, because
those regulations vary so widely between jurisdictions and among par-
ticular categories of beverages, and because there are so many differ-
ent products, it is increasingly important for wholesalers to employ
computer-based information management systems.80 “These informa-
tion systems help ensure that complex shipments, payments and taxes
are accurately tracked and that state and federal regulations are
met.”81 It would not make much sense for suppliers to maintain such
systems because their nationwide market would require a prohibi-
tively large and complex system that would be unwieldy to use.  By
the same token, individual suppliers lack the sales and inventory vol-
ume that would make such systems efficient for them.  Thus, wholesal-
ers who operate on a regional level are best positioned to employ such
system with the most favorable ratio of benefits to cost.82
In addition, wholesalers have a unique capacity to reduce the cost
of maintaining such computer systems.  These systems often have to
synchronize data with multiple sources.  Consequently, such systems
must be able to accommodate the wide variety hardware and software
that is already installed at these multiple sources.83 By reducing the
number of parties that need to transact directly with one another, the
business structure of the three-tier system “reduces the number of dif-
ferent computer systems that need to communicate directly with one
another, permitting greater interoperability of information systems
used in the wine and spirits industry and further reducing the costs of
distribution while increasing the range of services provided.”84
In short, the three-tier system provides opportunities for creating
economies of scale that simply would not exist in a world where sup-
pliers shipped directly to retailers or even to consumers.  Sibley and
Srinagesh estimate that “wholesaler activities reduce retailers’ costs
by almost $52.00 for every $1,000.00 in retailer sales, for a national
savings in retailer operating costs of $7.2 billion per year.”85  These
79. Id. at 14-15.
80. Id.
81. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 15.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 27.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 14 (citing JOHN DUNHAM, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WINE AND SPIRITS WHOLE-
SALERS (2008)).
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wholesaler-created economies of scale make it possible for consumers
to purchase at lower prices, which means that they have more disposa-
ble income to spend on a wider variety of products of all kinds.
Given their position between retailers and suppliers, wholesalers
have a unique opportunity to acquire and disseminate the flow of in-
formation necessary for effective marketing.  “Because wine and spir-
its are experience goods and highly influenced by marketing activities,
distributors’ knowledge of consumers’ purchasing habits can be criti-
cal to the whole industry.”86 Wholesalers have comprehensive infor-
mation about both the range of products available from suppliers and
the particular market characteristics within their regions, they have an
unparalleled ability to identify the best ways to promote products and
the best areas or market niches in which to promote them.87  This in-
formation comes, at least in part, from their maintenance of the kinds
of computer systems described above, which give them the capacity to
aggregate sales data and identify market trends in a way that suppliers
and retailers cannot.88
The economics of selling alcoholic beverages make this kind of mar-
keting expertise especially important.  When a supplier introduces a
new product, it will generate little profit at first because its promo-
tional costs will be high and it can be difficult to convince retailers to
provide shelf space for it.89  Indeed, the inventory holding costs associ-
ated with new brand introduction can exceed $1 million.90  Wholesal-
ers can reduce the promotional and inventory costs for new products
by making sure that promotions are targeted accurately and by main-
taining inventory that retailers might not be ready to maintain
themselves.91
The economic structure of the three-tier system also promotes effi-
cient outcomes by facilitating a certain degree of vertical integration
and the maintenance of minimum prices.  At first blush, such things
might seem to be anti-competitive.  But some recent economic studies
suggest that, under the right circumstances, they can have pro-compet-
itive effects.92  And the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that a degree of vertical integration and price floors are not necessa-
rily violations of antitrust law.93
86. Id. at 18.
87. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 18
88. Id.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 32-35.
93. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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Economists have recognized that, under certain conditions, restrict-
ing competition through the use of exclusive territories can solve fun-
damental business problems.94 For example, when marketing requires
a distributor to undertake certain activities that are difficult to specify,
monitor and measure, it may be difficult or impossible to regulate the
distributor’s compliance by contract. “By giving the distributor an ex-
clusive territory and some protection from intrabrand competition,
however, the supplier creates a financial incentive for the distributor
to undertake the required marketing investments necessary to com-
pete against brands represented by other wholesalers (interbrand
competition).”95
In its decision in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court has also recognized that the crea-
tion of exclusive territories and minimum retail prices can actually
promote competition rather than hinder it.96 When a supplier has an
exclusive agreement with a distributor, and when that agreement in-
cludes prescriptions about a minimum price for a product, such ar-
rangements can reduce intrabrand competition and stimulate the
distributor’s marketing efforts.97  This is because, in a territory where
a distributor has exclusive rights in a particular brand, that distributor
does not compete with any other provider of that brand in its terri-
tory, but it does have an incentive to invest in its brand in order to
compete vigorously against distributors of competing brands.98 Estab-
lishing a minimum price helps control the free-riding incentive, and
each distributor competes with other distributors by adding value to
its product.99  As the Leegin Court explained:
The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for
other vertical restraints. . . .  Minimum resale price maintenance can
stimulate interbrand competition—the competition among manu-
facturers selling different brands of the same type of product—by
reducing intrabrand competition—the competition among retailers
selling the same brand. . . .  The promotion of interbrand competi-
tion is important because “the primary purpose of the antitrust laws
is to protect [this type of] competition.” . . .  A single manufacturer’s
use of vertical price restraints tends to eliminate intrabrand price
competition; this in turn encourages retailers to invest in tangible or
intangible services or promotional efforts that aid the manufac-
94. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
418-24 (4th ed. 2005).
95. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 32.
96. Leegin, supra note 90, at 890.
97. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 33 (discussing Leegin).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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turer’s position as against rival manufacturers. Resale price mainte-
nance also has the potential to give consumers more options so that
they can choose among low-price, low-service brands; high-price,
high-service brands; and brands that fall in between.100
The sale of alcoholic beverages within the structure of the three-tier
system provides exactly the right kind of opportunity to promote the
pro-competitive effects described in Leegin. One study of beer sales in
Indiana confirms this conclusion.  It found that the prohibition of ex-
clusive territories for beer sales actually caused a decrease in beer
sales.101
III. THE THREAT TO THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM POSED
BY DIRECT SHIPMENT
One of the biggest challenges to the preservation of the three-tier
system has been the recent proliferation of small-scale producers of
beer, wine, and spirits, who seek to use the Internet as a means to sell
directly to retailers and consumers.  Some, including the Federal
Trade Commission, have suggested that these developments war-
ranted a significant reconsideration of how the market for alcoholic
beverages should be structured.102  These suggestions often overlook
the unique nature of this market and have generally overstated the
economic benefits that would come from expanding the scope of di-
rect shipment.
The recent expansion of small-scale production of alcoholic bever-
ages has been dramatic.  For example, the proportion of American
wine produced by small, family farm wineries has increased dramati-
cally in the last thirty years.103 According to some estimates, there are
now nearly 3000 such wineries, in the United States, double the num-
ber that existed in the late 1970s.104  There have been similar increases
in the number of small-scale craft breweries and distilleries.105
Given their small size, these boutique suppliers cannot furnish
enough products to meet the volume requirements of distributors in
100. Leegin, supra note 90, at 890 (internal citations omitted).
101. See Tim R. Sass & David S. Saurman, Efficiency Effects of Exclusive Territories: Evidence
from the Indiana Beer Market, in 34 ECON. INQUIRY 597, 614 (1996).
102. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COM-
MERCE: WINE (2003) 41, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_ documents/
ftc-staff-report-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf
(last visited Dec. 2, 2015).
103. Matthew B. Mills, Let History Be Our Guide: Using Historical Analogies to Analyze State
Response to a Post-Granholm Era, 81 IND. L.J. 1097, 1110-11 (2006).
104. Id.
105. Morris, supra note 17; 2012 Small & Independent Craft Brewers’ Growth in the Beer Cate-
gory, supra note 18.
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the three-tier system.106  The only economically viable way for these
smaller suppliers to reach consumers is to sell directly, either on their
own premises or over the Internet.107  This fact has inspired the con-
clusion that consumers will enjoy greater choice in products and lower
prices if direct shipment is widely permitted.
In 2003, the FTC issued a staff report that attracted significant at-
tention for expressing just such a conclusion.  The report compared
the prices of certain highly regarded wines at retail stores in McLean,
Virginia and at on-line retailers who shipped directly to the con-
sumer.108  The report concluded that direct shipment could result in
cost savings – provided the consumers ordered at least six bottles at a
time and chose the right kind of shipping method.109
But the virtues of direct shipment are easily overstated.110  To a
great extent, the economic benefits of direct shipment, which were
described in the FTC report, are available because of the role that
wholesalers play in informing consumers about which brands to seek
out from suppliers.  With the expansion of direct shipment to both
consumers and high-volume retailers, wholesalers will lose the eco-
nomic advantages that permit them to engage in valuable marketing
activities, and the entire market for wine – not to mention other alco-
holic beverages – will look much different.  As Sibley and Srinagesh
explain:
When regulations permit large retailers to bypass the three-tier sys-
tem, wholesalers will no longer have exclusive territories because
suppliers will also be able to sell direct to big-box retailers, whose
business models do not emphasize marketing investments in the
specific brands they carry. Unwilling to shoulder the marketing
alone, wholesale competitors are likely to refrain from brand-spe-
cific marketing activities, waiting instead for another wholesaler to
invest in marketing and to undertake the efforts necessary to create
or maintain customer demand for the product. Once another whole-
saler performs these activities, the competitors who did not make
comparable investments (including any big-box retailers) will bene-
fit from the increased brand awareness and demand stimulated by
others’ marketing efforts, despite not having performed the activi-
ties themselves. Competitors who did not engage in marketing ac-
tivities for the product can undersell the investors, essentially “free-
riding” on the investment of their rivals.111
106. Mills, supra note 100, at 1111.
107. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 99, at 1.
108. Id. at Appendix A.
109. Id.
110. Sibley & Srinagesh, supra note 14, at 28.
111. Id. at 34.
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Needless to say, a market characterized by skewed incentives and
rampant free-riding will not produce efficient outcomes.
Increasing direct shipment is also likely to result in more economic
power for large retail outlets at the expense of locally-owned retailers
and even wholesalers.  If the three-tier system is modified to permit
more direct shipment, big-box stores will be positioned to purchase at
discounted prices from large suppliers, while wholesalers and smaller-
sized retailers lose sales and profits.112  Consumers who shop for cer-
tain products at big-box retailers will benefit from lower prices on
those products, but the market as a whole will have less variety,
poorer information exchanges between consumers and suppliers, and
less popular brands will likely increase in price and be sold in fewer
outlets.113
Of course, more direct shipment to consumers and retailers will
have deleterious effects on regulation as well.  With respect to direct
shipments from suppliers to consumer, any regulations about who can
buy or about how much can be bought will be reduced to a kind of
“honor system.”  There will be no-one in position to assure that sales
are being conducted in accordance with law.114  In addition, direct
shipment eliminates the opportunity to restrict sales by limiting the
location and hours of operation for retail outlets, which have proven
to be effective regulatory responses to increased rates of alcohol
abuse or alcohol-related problems.115  Even more generally, direct
shipment undermines the regulatory regime in numerous problematic
ways.  As one state regulator pointed out in a testimony to Congress,
the direct shipment of alcohol “undermines the ability of states to
fully account for the sale of alcohol within their borders.”116
IV. GRANHOLM AND ITS EFFECT ON THREE-TIER SYSTEM
Despite the problems associated with direct shipment, not to men-
tion the uncertainty of its economic benefits, the momentum towards
removing legal obstacles to direct shipment has continued in the last
decade.  The most important event in this connection was the Su-
112. Id. at 38.
113. Id.
114. Legal Issues Concerning State Alcohol Regulation supra, note 64, at 41-42.
115. R.A. Hahn, et al., The Effectiveness of Policies Maintaining or Restricting Days of Alco-
hol Sales on Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Related Harms, 39 AM. J. PREV. MED. 575, 575
(2010); see also Schulte, supra note 65 (describing how state liquor control officials used re-
stricted hours for sales to address a localized increase in the rate of alcohol abuse and alcohol-
related crime).
116. Hearing on H.R. 5034, supra note 70, at 152.
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preme Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald.117  There, the Court
ruled that the Commerce Clause prohibited states from regulating di-
rect shipment in a manner that resulted in discrimination in favor of
intrastate direct shipments and against interstate direct shipments.
The dispute in Granholm arose from attempts by Michigan and
New York to regulate the direct shipment of wine from out-of-state
suppliers to in-state consumers.  Both New York and Michigan have
three-tier regulatory systems for the sale of alcoholic beverages, and
both states attempted to modify those systems by licensing in-state
wineries to sell their products directly to consumers while not offering
licenses to out-of-state wineries on the same terms.118  In Michigan,
out-of-state wineries could sell only to wholesalers licensed by the
state.119  In New York, out-of-state wineries could sell directly to New
York consumers only if they opened a branch, factory, office, or store-
room inside the state.120
A majority of the Supreme Court held that New York and Michigan
violated the Commerce Clause through their methods of regulating
direct shipment.  By focusing on the Commerce Clause as the core of
its analysis, the majority opinion made it clear that the problem with
the states’ laws was their discriminatory character, not their prohibi-
tion of direct shipment.
The rule prohibiting state discrimination against interstate com-
merce follows also from the principle that States should not be com-
pelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored
status for their own citizens. States do not need, and may not at-
tempt, to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual eco-
nomic interests. Cf. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Rivalries among
the States are thus kept to a minimum, and a proliferation of trade
zones is prevented. . . .
Laws of the type at issue in the instant cases contradict these princi-
ples. They deprive citizens of their right to have access to the mar-
kets of other States on equal terms. The perceived necessity for
reciprocal sale privileges risks generating the trade rivalries and ani-
mosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in
particular, the Commerce Clause were designed to avoid.121
In reaching the conclusion that the Commerce Clause controlled
the states’ ability to regulate alcohol sales, the Granholm majority re-
jected the idea that the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment
had enlarged the states’ regulatory power.  It held that:
117. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
118. Id. at 469-70.
119. Id. at 469.
120. Id. at 470.
121. Id. at 472-73.
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The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow States to
maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by
regulating its transportation, importation, and use. The Amendment
did not give States the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to
discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they had not en-
joyed at any earlier time.122
Apparently ignoring the Court’s focus on the discriminatory effect
of the regulations, some commentators concluded that removing bar-
riers to direct shipment could – or should – open the door to a nation-
wide market in the direct shipment of all kinds of alcoholic beverage
products to consumers and retailers.123  But the majority opinion in
Granholm asserted unequivocally that the three-tier system was “‘un-
questionably legitimate.’”124  In addition, subsequent case law in the
lower courts made it clear that the problem with the New York and
Michigan laws in Granholm was the fact that they discriminated
against interstate commerce, not that they imposed restrictions on di-
rect shipment.
In one of the earliest post-Granholm decisions, Brooks v. Vassar,
the Fourth Circuit considered a challenge by Virginia consumers and
out-of-state wineries to the volume limits on personal importation,
which were a part of Virginia’s alcoholic beverage control law.125  The
Fourth Circuit’s ruling focused on the plaintiffs’ argument that Vir-
ginia discriminated against interstate commerce by limited direct sales
from out-of-state wineries to consumers to a total of one gallon or
four liters of wine.126  In rejecting this argument, the appeals court
pointed out that, after some recent amendments, Virginia’s law re-
quired all in-state wineries to sell to Virginia customers only through
the three-tier system, either through their own retail outlets, which
had to be licensed within the system, or through wholesalers, who also
were licensed within the system.127  The Fourth Circuit found no “eco-
nomic protectionism” in Virginia’s regulatory scheme, and therefore
concluded that it did not contradict the Commerce Clause principles
that were at the core of Granholm.128
122. Id. at 484-85.
123. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 7, at 1905; Kristin Woeste, Reds, Whites, and Roses: The
Dormant Commerce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment, and the Direct Shipment of Wine, 72
U. CIN. L. REV. 1821, 1845-46 (2004)
124. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
(1986)).
125. Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2006).
126. Id. at 352.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 352-54.
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The Second Circuit also relied heavily on the concept of “economic
protectionism” in its analysis of a similar challenge to New York regu-
lations in Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle.129  There, the regulations at
issue permitted an in-state alcoholic beverage retailer to deliver di-
rectly to consumers’ residences in New York, using the retailer’s own
vehicles or by using vehicles of a transportation company licensed by
the State’s liquor authority; but out-of-state retailers did not have the
same permission.130  The Second Circuit concluded that the New York
law did not violated Commerce Clause prohibitions against discrimi-
natory legislation because, under Granholm, the Commerce Clause
only prohibits discrimination against out-of-state products and pro-
ducers.131  In this connection, the Second Circuit noted that, in any
state, there are aspects of the three-tier system that are inherently dis-
criminatory against out-of-state entities.  For example, in many states,
wholesalers and retailers must be physically present in the state in or-
der to get a license.  And there is no question that this kind of discrim-
ination is part of the system that the Granholm Court identified as
unquestionably legitimate.132  Thus, the Second Circuit ruled that the
New York regulations were not unconstitutional because they did not
discriminate against out-of-state products or producers.133
In Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Steen, the Fifth Circuit confirmed
that Granholm did not undermine the integrity of the three-tier sys-
tem generally and that it only prohibited regulations within a system
that created discrimination against interstate commerce.134  This case
arose from a challenge to several different Texas regulations by par-
ties outside of Texas who wanted to make retail sales directly to Texas
consumers.  In particular, the case focused on rules that permitted an
in-state retailer to deliver wine to consumers within the county in
which the retailer was located but that prohibited out-of-state retailers
from delivering wine to consumers in Texas.135  The Fifth Circuit held
that such rules passed constitutional muster because they did not dis-
criminate against out-of-state products or producers and because a set
of rules governing local distribution of any products within the state
was a “benign incident of an acceptable three-tier system.”136
129. Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2009).
130. Id. at 188.
131. Id. at 191.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Siesta Vill. Mkt., LLC v. Steen, 595 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010).
135. Id. at 260-61.
136. Id. at 260.
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CONCLUSION
Given the dramatic effects that e-commerce and Internet marketing
have had on the economy, it should not be surprising that there would
be political ferment for changes in the regulation of alcohol sales, so
that selling beer, wine, and spirits could be changed in the way that
the sale of other commodities has been.  But, as Americans have long
recognized, alcohol cannot be sold in the same way as any other com-
modity.  Its use can lead to risks of significant problems for public
health and social welfare, and the sale of alcohol must be regulated in
a manner that reduces the chances of abusive consumption.
After over a century of trying to develop an effective method for
such regulation, the United States finally succeeded in the wake of
Prohibition, when it developed the three-tier system that has worked
so well for over eighty years.  The regulatory structure of this system
maximizes the opportunities to tailor regulations to local conditions
and to assure that regulators remain informed about developing
problems.  In addition, the three-tier system provides substantial eco-
nomic benefits by improving the flow of information about consumer
demand, spreading marketing costs efficiently, and by minimizing
some of the transaction costs that can come from trying to find the
right retail outlets for the thousands of different alcoholic beverage
products that are produced at any one time.  Overall, the three-tier
system has succeeded at maximizing the economic benefits of alcohol
sales while minimizing the social risk.
Changing the operation of the three-tier system should not, there-
fore, be taken lightly, even if direct shipment from producers to retail-
ers and consumers seems to offer a way to expand markets and foster
the development of new suppliers and brands.  When properly limited
and regulated, direct shipment can be a useful addition to the alco-
holic beverage industry.  But such direct shipment must be maintained
within the framework of the three-tier system.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm might have
seemed to offer a chance for a dramatic expansion of direct shipment
and a transformation of the regulatory scheme for selling alcohol, a
careful reading of that decision, along with subsequent judicial rulings
have made it clear that the three-tier system is still consistent with the
Constitutional order.  While states may not use the three-tier system
as an instrument for discriminating against certain products on the ba-
sis of where they are made, the system can and should impose other
kinds of limits on direct shipment to assure that the regulatory and
economic benefits of that system remain unimpaired.
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